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The President, in his message of June 1st, 1872, said:"It is a general principle of both international and municijal
law that all property is held subject not only to be taken by the
Government for public uses, in which case, under the Constitution
of the United States, the owner is entitled to just compensation, but
also subject to be temporarily occupied, or even actually destroyed,
in times of great public danger and when the public safety demands
it, and in this latter case governmbuts do not admit a legal obligation on their part to compensate the owner. The temporary occupation of, injuries to, and destruction of property caused by actual
and necessary military operations are generally considered to fall
70
within the last-mentioned principle."
Wm. LAWRENCE.
(To be continued.)
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Court of Chancery of New Jersey.
SARAH M. GARNSEY

ET AL.

v. ELIZABETH

MUNDY

ET AL.

A voluntary deed of trust, reserving no power of revocation, made with a nominal
consideration and without legal advice as to its effect, and where there was evidence

that its effect was misunderstood by the grantor, was set aside and a reconveyance
ordered.
The fact that the grantor's infant children were the beneficiaries under the trustdeed was not sufficient to prevent the relief.

Tiirs was a bill in equity to have a trust-deed set aside and
cancelled. The facts appear in the opinion.
JFm. 1B. .11artin,for complainants.
P1 TVayne Parker,for defendants.
RUNYON, Cliancellor.-On the 4th of Febuary 1861, the complainant, Sarah M. Garnsey, who was then a single woman (her
waiden name being Sarah M. Mundy), and of the age of about
twenty-one years, was seised in her own right, in fee, in possession,
through inheritance from her father, James Mundy, deceased, of a
parcel of unimproved farming land of about seven acres in Middlesex county in this state, and was also the owner of an undivided
7' Senate Ex. Doe. S5, 2d sess. 42d Cong., veto bill for relief of i. Milton Best;
Senate Rep. 412, 3d sess. 42d Cong; Vattel (6th Am. Ed.) 402 ; 4 Term R. 382.
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third of the remaindor, in fee, of two other lots there-one a wood
lot of about two acres, and the other the house lot, containing about
nine and a half acres, which had been set off to her mother, Elizabeth Mundy, in dower. She had no other property, real or personal. By a deed of that date she conveyed in fee to her mother,
for the expressed consideration of natural love and affection to the
grantor's daughter, Elmina May, and of 50 cents to her paid by
her mother, the whole of said property on the following trust
"That the said Elizabeth Mundy shall and will hold, use, occupy,
and rent the same, and receive the rents, issues and profits thereof
to and for the maintenance of said Elmina May Mundy until she
shall arrive at the age of twenty-one years, or in case of her death,
the said Elizabeth Mundy, her heirs or assigns shall pay the rents
or profits arising as above to the said Sarah M. Mundy, and in
further trust to convey the land and premises, with the appurtenances hereinbefore mentioned, in fee simple, to the said Elmina
May Mundy, or in equal shares to her and any other children of
said Sarah M. Mundy (should there be any other) when the youngest of said children shall have attained the age of twenty-one years;
and in the event that no issue of the said Sarah M. Mundy shall
survive to inherit the same, that the estate herein named shall be
conveyed according to the direction of the executor of the will of
the said Sarah M_ Mundy heretofore made."
In 1864 Sarah M. Mundy was married to Silas Garnsey. The
bill is filed by her and her husband against her two children and
her mother, the trustee, to set aside the deed. The property at the
time of making the conveyance in question was and still is of but
little value as farming land. The buildings upon the house lot,
which alone was improved, were old and dilapidated and have gone
to decay, and even the fences on the premises are down. The
trustee, who is a woman of advanced age, was and is wholly without
means except her dower. The "deed was wholly voluntary. It
was made at the suggestion and on the advice of the grantor's
.mother and of her uncle, Dr. Jacob Martin, her mother's brother.
The grantor neither proposed nor suggested it. Indeed it appears
she knew nothing of it until it was presented to her for her signature and she was urged by her mother and her uncle to execute
it "for her good." Their motive, they say, was to save the pro
perty for her, to prevent her from improvidently disposing of it.
No professional advice whatever was taken. The deed was drawn
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by a son of Dr. Martin, at the latter's direction, and its execution
was witnessed by Dr. Martin, who being a commissioner of deeds
took the grantor's acknowledgment. The grantor had no advice
whatever except that which her mother and uncle gave her.
Not only was she not consulted in regard to the matter in any
way, but it was clear that she did not understand the provisions of the deed, nor their effect. She did not suppose that the
effect of the conveyance would be to place the property beyond her
reach and control. Nay, her mother and uncle both supposed that
the trust was revocable, and that the grantor under it retained full
power to sell the property with the trustee's" consent. The conveyance not only deprived the grantor of all her property without
reserving a power of revocation to enable her to meet the exigencies
of life, but the arrangement which it made was in other respects
injudicious, disadvantageous and improvident. rThe motives and
intentions of the mother and uncle were most praiseworthy. Their
design manifestly was simply to put the property in such a position
that the grantor could not dispose of it without her mother's consent and concurrence. They in good faith urged her to make the
deed. She and they were alike under an erroneous impression as
to the effect of it. From the operation of such a conveyance, made
under such circumstances, equity will relieve the complainants",
The rigidity of the ancient doctrine that a voluntary settlement,
not obtained by fraud, is binding on the settlor and will not be
set aside in equity, although the settlor has not reserved a power of
revocation ( Villers v. Beaumont, 1 Vernon 100; Petre v. .Espinasse,
2 M. & K. 496; Bill v. cureton, 2 M. & K. 503), has been relaxed by modern decisions. In the case first cited, Viller8 v. Beaumont, decided in 1682, the Lord Chancellor said: "If a man will
improvidently bind himself up by a voluntary deed and not reserve
a liberty to himself by a power of revocation, this court will not
loose the fetters he hath put on himself, but he must lie down under his own folly." Recent cases, however, have narrowed the
doctrine, and have held not only that the absence of a power of
revocation throws on the person seeking to uphold the settlement
the burden of proving that such a power was intentionally excluded
by the settlor, and that in the absence of such proof thesettlement may be set aside, but that equity will set aside the settlement
on the application of the settlor where it appears that he did not
intend to make it irrevocable, or where the settlement would be
unreasonable or improvident for the lack of a provision for revocation. In Everitt v. .Everitt (1870), L. R. 10 Eq. 405, a case almost
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precisely similar in its facts to that under cansideration, a voluntary settlement was set aside on the application of the donor. The
court said : "It is very difficult indeed for any voluntary settlement,
made by a young lady so soon after she attained twenty-one, to
stand if she afterwards changes her mind and wishes to get rid of
the fetters which she has been advised to put upon herself."
In Wollaston v. Tribe (1869), L. R. 9 Eq. 44, a voluntary gift,
which was not subject to a power of revocation, but was meant to
be irrevocable, was held to be invalid, and was set aside on the
donor's application. In pronouncing the decree, the court said:
"Of course, a voluntary gift is perfectly good if the person who
makes it knows what it is, and intended to carry it into execution."
In Goutts v. Acworth, L. R. 8 Eq. 558, it was held that " Where
the circumstances are such that the donor in a voluntary settlement or gift ought to be advised to retain a power of revocation,
it is the duty of the solicitor to insist on the insertion of such
power, and the want of it will in general be fatal to the deed."
In Prideaux v. Lonsdale (1863), 1 D. J. & S. 433, a voluntary
settlement, which the settlor was advised to execute by persons
under whose influence as regarded money matters she was, and
which subjected her propetty to trusts and contained provisions
which the court thought it was impossible to suppose she understood, and against which she ought to have been advised and
cautioned, was set aside. In Hall v. J1all, L. R. 14 Eq. 365, it
was held that a voluntary settlement should contain a power of
revocation, and if it does not the parties who rely on it must prove
that thesettlor 'was properly advised when he executed it, and that
he thoroughly understood the effect of omitting the power, and
that he intended it to be excluded from the settlement, and,
further, if that is not established and the court sees from the surrounding circumstances that the settlor believed the instrument to
be revocable, it will, even after the lapse of twenty years and the
death of the settlor, interfere and give relief against it. The
decree in that case was reversed. (1873, i. R. 8 Chan.- Ap. 430.)
Tn his opinion, SELBORNE, L. 0., said: "The absence of a power
of revocation in a voluntary deed, not impeached on the ground
of any undue influence, is of course material, where it appears
that the settlor did not intend to make an irrevocable settlement,
or where the settlement itself is of such a nature or was made
under such circumstances as to be unreasonable and improvident,
unless guarded by a power of revocation." Porshaw v. Welsby,
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30 Beav. 243, was a case where a voluntary settlement was made
by one, in extremig, on his family. It contained no power of
revocation in case of the settler's recovery. On his recovery it
was set aside on his application, on the ground that it was not
executed with the intention that it should be operative in case of
his recovery from his illness. See also .MLagueninv. Baseley, Lead.
Cas. in Eq. 406; Cook v. Lamotte, 15 Beav. 241; Sharp v.
Leach, 31 Beav. 491 ; .Phillisonv. Keny, 32 Beav. 628. It is
not necessary, however, to resta- decision of this case adverse to
the deed on so narrow a foundation as the mere absence of a power
of revocation. The circumstances under which a voluntary deed
was executed maybe shown, with a view to impeaching its validity,
and if it appears that it was fraudulent or improperly obtained,
equity will decree that it be given up and cancelled. In the
present case there is no room for doubt that the grantor was induced by those in whom she very justly placed confidence, and by
whose better judgment she was willing to be guided, to execute a
voluntary deed whose effect she and they not only did not understand, but, on the other hand, misapprehended, and which, so far
from being according to their intentions, was in two very Important respects, at least, admittedly precisely the reverse. It was
irrevocable, but they all supposed it was revocable and intended
that it should be so. It deprived the grantor of the power of
sale, but they all supposed that she would have that power and iitended that she should have it, clogged only by the necessity of
obtaining her mother's consent and concurrence in any bargain or
conveyance she might make. The deed contains no power of sale
whatever.7 ' The testimony of all the parties to the transaction, the
grantor, her mother and uncle, has been taken in the cause. It
satisfies me that the deed was not " the pure, voluntary, well-understood act of the grantor's mind "-(Lord ELDON in iHuguenin v.
Baseley)-but was unadvised and improvident, and contrary to the
intention of all of them. The fact that the infant children of the
grantor are beneficiaries under the deed will not prevent the court
from setting it aside: Huguenin v Baseley, Everitt v. Everitt,
ubi sup. There will be a decree that the deed be delivered up to
be cancelled.
It may be premised, before entering itself could be undoubtedly sustained
upon a discussion of the subject suggested upon the simple ground (if upon no
by the principal case, that the decision other) that the grantor acted withou

GARNSEY v. MUNDY.
any independent professional advice.
The absence of such advice, in the case
of a voluntary conveyance, would seem
to be decisive in favor of the right of
the party executing it to ask that it be
set aside. And this is particularly the
case where the party for whose benefit
the voluntary conveyance is made, or
even he who induces its execution, stands
in any confidential relation towards the
grantor. "I take it to be a well established principle of this court," said Lord
Justice TuNRzx in Rhode.s v. Bate, L.
R. 1 Ch. 252-257, "that persons standing in a confidential relation towards
others, cannot entitle themselves to hold
benefits which those others may have
conferred upon them, unless they can
show, to the satisfaction of the court,
that the persons by whom the benefits
have been conferred had competent and
independent advice in conferring them."
In acc6rdance with this doctrine it had
been held in Prideaux v. Lonsdale, 4
Giff. 159 (affirmed on appeal, in I D.
J. & S. 433), that a settlement of a
legacy made by a lady.a short time before her marriage, under the persuasion
of the executors of the will, could be
avoided by her on the ground that it had
been made without any consultation
with her solicitor. In Leach v. Farr, a
case in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, at Nisi Prius, it appeared that an
ante-nuptial marriage settlement, which,
was attacked on the ground that it was
a fraud upon the husband's marital
rights, had been executed by the young
lady without any indepifident advice of
counsel ; and, therefore, upon an intimation from the court (Mr. Justice
SHAPSWOOD) that, on that ground alone,
the settlement would -have to be set
aside, the case was compromised. Indeed, the doctrine is doubtless well established in England and in this
country; and the cases just cited are
only illustrations of a thoroughly settled
principle.

Passing, now, to the question suggested by the principal case, viz., what
is the ef et of the absence of a power
of revocation in a voluntary deed? it
will be convenient before noticing the
cases, to state briefly one or two principles which should always be borne in
mind in considering the authorities upon
this point.
First;It is a well settled rule-as well
settled as any otherruleof law or equitythat an executed voluntary settlement
not tainted with fraud or affected by
mistake, is binding on the settlor. No
matter how unfortunate, unjust or absurd
such a settlement may unexpectedly
prove to be, the general rule, above
stated, is certainly beyond dispute. Nor
is the rule altered by the circumstance
that the limitations of the trust are of
an executory character; for if the trust
is completely declared, equity, it is now
held, will give effect to its provisions in
favor of a volunteer. The leading authority upon this subject, it will be remembered, is Kekewich v. Manning,
I De G. I. & G. 176, in which the
former conflict between the cases was
settled, and this decision has been
followed in many subsequent authori'ties; see Hill on Trustees 140, note, 4th
Am. Ed. Indeed, the strength of the
modern tendency in favor of upholding
voluntary settlements may be seen from
those decisions in which it has been
held that an instrument inoperative as
an assignment of the legal title, may
yet take effect as a declaration of trust
on the part of the wonld-be assignor:
See Richardson v. Richardson, L. R. 3
Eq. 686 ; Morgan v. alleson, L. R. 10
Eq. 475.
Secondly; On the other hand it is
equally well settled that an instrumerit
obtained by fraud, or which is executed
under a mistake and so as not to correctly represent the intention of the
party executing the same, will be set
aside on the application of the grantor.
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A principle so plain and so well recognised as this, seems to require no citations
in its support.
Between these two well established
doctrines there runs a line of cases (of
which the principal case is a type), in
which it has been found necessary to use
not a little care and skill in order to
avoid a violation of one or the other of the
two principles just stated. And although
the question involved is not one of very
great difficulty, there seems to have been,
at times, a confusion in the minds of
some of the judges leading to expressions of opinion, some of which, if followed to their legitimate consequences,
would make a serious inroad upon the
doctrine of voluntary trusts. This will
be apparent from an examination of a
few of the cases.
One of the earliest reported decisions
upon this subject, is Villars v. Beaumont, I Vern. 99, decided in 1682.
The case was this: William Beaumont,
who was entitled to a lease of a hospital
in Leicester for three lives, a short time
before his death, by a little scrap of
paper at an alehouse, but under his
hand and seal, settled the term upon the
plaintiffs (his cousins) to the intent to
pay his debts, and gave the surplus to
them.
Afterwards, being dissatisfied
with the settlement, he made his will in
writing, whereby he devised the term,
subject to the payment of his debts, to
the defendant. After argument by counsel on both sides : "There is no color
in this case," said the Lord Chancellor
(NOTTrNo Ax). "If a man will improvidently bind himself by a voluntary
deed, and not reserve a liberty to himself by a power of revocation, this court
will not loose the fetters he hath put
upon himself, but he must lie down
under his own folly ; for if you relieve
in such a case, you.must consequently
establish this proposition, vi7.: That a
man can make no voluntary disposition of
his estate, but by his will osly, whirA would
be absurd."

The next case appears to be -Valdred v. Gilham, I P. Wins. 577, which
occurred in 1719, and in which there
began, upon this subject, that fluctuation in the decisions which seems to
have continued down to very recent
times. In this case the aunt of the
plaintiff made a voluntary settlement
upon him but retained the deed in her
possession. Having subsequently determined to settle the premises upon her
nephew Gilham (the defendant), and
having consulted counsel upon the subject, she was informed (it afterwards
turned out, erroneously) that she had
put it out of her power-whereupon she
expressed great concern, saying that she
had been imposed upon. She afterwards
destroyed the settlement and executed a
new settlement in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff, by fraud, subsequently procured a copy of the first settlement, and in this bill attempted to set
it up. On the case coming before the
3faster of the Rolls, ", his Honor, with
great clearness, determined for the plaintiff;" but on appeal to Lord Chancellor
PARKER, his Lordship reversed the decree at the Rolls, declaring "that it was
plain that the aunt intended to keep the
estate in her power, that she designed
there should be a power of revocation
in the settlement * * * * that in fact
she appeared to have been imposed upon
by preparing and making the conveyance absolute, which it had been unrcasonable in any one to have asked of
her." It will be observed that this decision proceeded upon the ground of
fraud ; but the intimation is ilso thrown
out that in the absence of any, motive for
an irrev"ocable 91J?, it is unreasonable
that a voluntary conveyance should be
without a power of revocation, which
points to the idea, expressed in very
recent cases presently to be noticed, that
the burden of sustaining such a gift falls
upon the donee.
In 1807, in the celebrated case of
Huguenin v. Baseley, 14 Ves. 273, the
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judicial intellect of Lord ELDON and
the eloquence of Sir SAMUEL ROM LLY
were brought to bear upon this subject.
In that case the doctrine is put upon
the true ground, and one which has been
again adopted in the most recent English decisions upon the subject, by the
most accomplished equity judges of
modern times.
In Lord ELDo's mind, following
Lord IIARDWICKE'S reasoning in Bridgman v. Green, 2 Ves. 627, the effect to
be given to the absence of a power of
revocation appears to have been that it
was to he regarded as strong evidence that
the party did not understand the transaction, whence arose a strong inference
of an undue purpose (14 Yes. 296).
"Repeating therefore, distinctly," said
the Chancellor, "that this court is not
to undo voluntary deeds, I represent the
question thus: whether she executed
these instruments not only voluntarily,
but with that knowledge of all their
effect, 'nature and consequences which
the defendant B3aseley and the attorney
were bound by their duty to communicate
to her before she was suffered to execute
them:" (Id. 300).
It must be remembered, however, that
in this case the attorney obtained a
benefit under one of the instruments,
and that Mrs. Baselcy had no independent professional advice.
The decisions in both of the cases last
cited could manifestly be sustained on
the general ground of fraud, and therefore the remarks of Lord Chancellor
rPARKER and Lord ELDOx, already
quoted, cannot be considered as absolutely essential to the decision in either
case. Nor should it be supposed that
because Lord Esmox laid great stress
upon the absence of a power of revocation, that circumstance alone is sufficient
to set the instrument aside. That it
would be an error to draw such a conclusion from the opinion in iuguenain v.
Baseleg, has been recently pointed out by

Lord Justice JAMIps in Hall v. Hull,
presently to be noticed: see L. I. 8 Ch.
436. Still, it may e fiirly said that
the dicta of Lord ELDON go very far
towards approving of the conclusive
effect of the absence of a power of revocation when there is no apparent rnotir'
for an irrevocablegft.
Leaving these cases, it will be proper,
before coming to the most recent authorities, to notice one or two intermediate
decisions in which the courts seemed inclined to return to the stricter rule of
Villars v. Beaumont.
In Petre v. Espinasse, 2 M. & K. 496,
the court refused to disturb a voluntary
settlement which bad been made by an
extravagant spendthrift to protect himself from the consequences of his own
improvidence ; and in Bill v. Cureton,
2 M. & K. 503, a similar decision was
made in the case of a lady who had
made a !settlement, not at all in contemplation of matrimony, and entirely untainted with fraud and unaffected by
mistake. The Master of the Rolls, indeed, in his opinion (page 509) speaks
somewhat of putting the case upon the
same ground as that upon which Petre
v. Espinassewas decided; hut the statement of facts in the report presents no
such ground, and the decision would
seem to be a direct authority against the
position that the absence of a power of
revocation Is, of itself, sufficient to sustain an application to set the instrument
aside.
In Hastings v. Orde, 11 Sim. 205, the
doctrine of the necessity for the insertion
of a power of revocation came again
into the ascendant. If brevity is the
soul of law as well as of wit, then the
opinion of Vice Chancellor Sir L.%u.ICELOT SHADWELL is a model as a statement of a case, and an announcement
of the conclusion reached. "The case
is this: A female infant being entitled
to cboies in action, a settlement was
made of them, on her marriage, in trust
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for her husband for life, and after his
decease, in trust for her for life, and
after the decease of the survivor, in trust
for the children of the marriage, and if
there should be no child, then in trust
for such persons as she should appoint
by her will with the ultimate trust for her
next of kin; and the marriage having
been put an end to, and there being no
issue, the question is whether the lady is
still bound by the settlement. I am of
opinion that she is not bound by it." It
will be observed, however, that in this
case there was a failure of the motive
which had induced the creation of the
voluntary trust.
In several modern English authorities
there appeared a strong tendency to insist upon the presence of a power of
revocation in volnntarysettlements; and
the doctrine was on the point of being
pushed beyond its legitimate bounds,
when it was arrested by two recent decisions of the Court of Appeals in Chancery. The cases in which the doctrine
was carried to extreme lengths are
Coutts v. Ackworth, L. R. 8 Eq. 558;
Everitt v. Everitt, 10 Id. 405, and Hall
v. Hall, 14 Id. 365. Coutts v. Ackworth
could, indeed, be supported on the ground
that the settler had no independent
advice, hut relied upon the solicitor of
the party who was benefited by the settlement; but Everitt v. Everitt was not
favorably regarded in Phillips v. Mfullings, L. R. 7 Ch. 244; and the judgment in Hall v. Hall was reversed on
appeal; L. R. 8 Ch.430. In Phillipsv.
Mullings, Lord HATHERLEY, afteradvertiog to the rule that any one taking any
advantage under a voluntary deed, and
setting it up against the donor, must
show that he thoroughly understood
what he was doing, or at all events was
protected by independent advice, and
also to the rule that where a person executes a voluntary irrevocable deed, it
must be shown, in order to support the
deed, that the nature thereof was thoroughly understood by the party executing
VOL. XX I.-24

it, reached the conclusion that whether
there should be a power of revocation or
not depends upon circumstances ; and
that "it cannot be laid down as a general
rule that such a deed would be voidable
unless it contained a power of revocation." But in Hall v. Hall, L. R. 8
Cl. 430, the whole subjet was most
satisfactorily discussed and the authorities reviewed. In that case a widow executed a deed, which she had instructed
her solicitor to prepare, settling certain
houses and buildings on herself for her
life and after her death for the benefit
of her children. There was no suggestion made to her that the deed ought to
contain a power of revocation. Some
years afterwards she burnt it, and expressed her satisfaction at having got
rid of it. It was held that the deed was
valid, and was not affected by the want
of a power of revocation. "The true
rule," said Lord Justice JAMES, "is
that which was laid down by Lord Justice TURNER in Toker v. Toker, 3 D. J.
& S. 487, 491, that the absence of a
power of revocation is a circumstance to
be taken into account, and is of more
or less weight according to the otlter
circumstances of each case." See also
Henshall v. Fereday, 29 Law Times 46,.
where, under the circumstances, the voluntary deed was set aside. Reference
may also be had to Cooke v. Ltatotte,
15 Beav. 234, and WVollaston v. Tribe,
L. R. 9 Eq. 44.
Besides the principal case, we have
found but one American decision where
this doctrine has been discussed and applied. The case referred to is Evans v.
Russell, 31 Leg. Int. 125, in the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, decided in April
1874. The case was this. The complainant, prior to her marriage, execued.a settlement conveying her property in-trust to
pay the income to herself for life, with
power to appoint the capital by will
among the children of the marriage, and
in default of issue to and among her
sisters and brother, and in default of
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appointment, to them in certain proportions. The deed contained no power of
revocation nor of testamentary appointment after the cesser of the marriage in
her lifetime, and nothing was said at
or before the time of the execution of
the instrument as to the omission of
these powers, except that the complainant was informed that she could make
her will if she pleased. There was no
issue of the marriage, and the complainant survived her husband. It was held
that she was entitled to a reconveyance
by the trustees. The ground upon which
the case was put was that of a mixed
mistake oflaw and fact; the contingency
which happened not having been presented to the mind of the settlor, and,
therefore, her attention not having been
directed to the circumstance that the
legal operation of the deed upon the
happening of this contingency would be
different from what she would have provided had the contingency been suggested
to her. In this case Chief Justice AGNEw
seems to have laid down the true rule
upon this subject. " In the absence of a
certain intent to make the fflts irrevocable," says that learned judge, "the omission of a power to revoke is primdfacie
evidence of a mistake, and casts the burden of supporting the settlement upon
him who, without consideration or motive
to ben it him or protect the donor, claims
a mere gratuity against one who is sui
juris and capable of taking care of his
own estate."
From the decisions which have been
here briefly discussed the following conclusions can safely be drawn.
First: Where there is a deliberate gift.
with full knowledge of the consequences
of the act, made by a person sui juris,
the absence of a power of revocation is
not, primd facie, enough to set the in-

strument aside. The absence of motive
is immaterial, if an intent to make an
irrevocable gift is apparent. And (it is
submited) that this intent is sufficiently
proved, in the first instance, whenever
a person of sound mind and sui juris
executes an instrument of whose contents he has been informed. Thus if a
person of perfect mental capacity, and
under no disability, were deliberately to
execute a gift to an entire stranger, with
a full knowledge of the contents of the
instrumnent, and without the slightest
evidence of fraud or mistake, it would
seem reasonable that an intent on the
part of the settlor to make an irrevocable gift of his property should be presumed.
Second: Even in the absence of a
certain and definite intent to make an
irrevocable gift, the omission of a power
of revocation will not, of itself, be
enoughI to set the instrument aside, if
there exists a motive for making and sustaining an irrevocable gift: e. g., where
the settlement is made for the purpose
of the settlor's guarding against his own
extravagance or dissipation, as in Petre
v. Espinasse, and (semble) Bill v. Cureton, suzpra.
Thif-d: But where the deliberate intent
to make an irrevocable gift does not appear, and where no motive for such a gift
is shqwn, the absence of a power of
revocation is prind facie evidence of
mistake. The rule is the same when the
motive has failed, as was thle case in
.lastings v. Orde and Brans v. Russell,
supra.
Fourth : It is the duty of the solicitor
who prepares the settlement to see that
the irrevocable nature of the instrument
is fully understood by the settlor: see
May on Voluntary Alienations 452.
G. T. BusPRAse.

STATE v. BUCKLEY.

Supreme Court of Brrors of Connecticut.
STATE v. BUCKLEY

AND

ANOTHER.

The Act of 1872 imposes a penalty on every person who shall keep a place where
it is reputed that intoxicating liquors are kept for sale, without having a license
therefor. Held to be sufficient that the place was reputed to be one where intoxicating liquors were kept for sale, and not necessary that it be reputed that they
were kept for sale without a license.
In a prosecution under this act the accused claimed that the act was unconstitutional, and asked the court to charge the jury that they were judges of the law as
well as of the facts. The judge instructed the jury that in a criminal case they
were judges of the law as well as of the facts, but that they were under the same
obligation in the matter with the judge on the bench, and were not authorized
to say that that is not law which is so; that the Supreme Court had decided the
act to be constitutional, and that in his opinion it was constitutional ; that if they
decided that to be unconstitutional which the Supreme Court had decided to be
constitutional, they would disturb the-foundations of law ; but that, after all, they
were judges of the law, and if on their consciences they could say that the act was
unconstitutional they ought to acquit the accused. Held, on motion of the accused
for a new trial, that the charge was correct.
By statute the jury are made the judges of the law in criminal cases, but not in
any such sense that they are at liberty to disregard the law. They are to inquire
what the law is, and where their judgment is satisfied, the law as thus ascertained
is binding upon them, and should be their guide, whether it is or is not as they
may think it ought to be.
INFORMATION to the Superior Court in Litehfield county, for a
violation of the Act of 1872, which provides that "every person
who shall keep a house, store, shop, saloon, or other place, where
.it is reputed that spirituous or intoxicating liquors, ale, or lager
beer, are kept for sale, without having a license therefor, shall be
punished, &c. ;" tried to the jury on the plea of "not guilty,"
before MINOR, J. Verdict "guilty," and motion for a new trial
by the defendants. The case is fully stated in the opinion.

TV. T.

Baton and B. W. Seymour, in support of the motion.

Poster and Penn, contrg.
The first
CARPENTER, J.-This motion presents two questions.
relates to the construction of the act on which the prosecution is
brought. The defendants' counsel asked the court to charge the
jury that the state must prove that the place kept by the defendants was a place in which it was reputed that spirituous liquors
were kept for sale; and also, that it was reputed that such liquors
were kept for sale without a proper license therefor. The court
declined to comply with the last request, and charged the jury
otherwise. The instruction given was entirely correct. The mani-
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fest intention of the legislature was to prohibit any person, not
having a license, from keeping a place in which it was reputed
that spirituous, or intoxicating liquors, &c., are kept for sale.
That is the obvious meaning of the language of the act, and it would
be a forced and unnatural construction to hold that the reputation
must extend beyond the matter of keeping for sale, and negative a
license.
The other question arises from the charge to the jury.
The defendants claimed that the act under which they were prosecuted was unconstitutional and void. The court submitted that
question to the jury, telling them that they were the judges of the
law as well as of the facts. The court then added as follows:" But the jury are the judges of the law under the same obligations
that attach to the judge on the bench ; they are not authorized to
say that that is not law which is the law of the state. The .Supreme Court has decided that section to be constitutional. The
judges of that court are selected for their learning in the law.
Will you say it is unconstitutional, when they say it is constitutional? The next case to be tried may be a civil case, the law
applicable to which may have been decided by the same Supreme
Court; you would not suffer your private views and interests to
influence you to disregard the law thus decided. Neither have
you anything to do with the policy of the law; that belongs to the
legislature which enacted it. Th6 court also says to you that in
its judgment the section of the statute, upon which this prosecution
is founded, is constitutional. If you decide that to be unconstitutional which the Supreme Court holds to be constitutional, you
will disturb the foundations of law. But after all, you are the
judges of the law, and if on your consciences you can say this
section is unconstitutional, then you ought to acquit the accused."
The defendants now claim that the court in so charging infringed
upon the province of the jury. Our statute on that subject is as
follows :-" The court shall state its opinion to the jury, upon all
questions of law arising in the trial of a criminal cause, and submit to their consideration both the law and the facts, without any
direction how to find their verdict." This statute makes the jury
the judges of the law, but not in the sense in which it is sometimes
claimed. They are not the judges of the law in such a sense that
they are at liberty to disregard it ; nor are they in any case at
liberty to set aside the law, and substitute for it something else
which suits their prejudices or caprices better. Neither are they
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at liberty, if the law applicable to the case does not meet their approval, to make law for the occasion. But they are to inquire what
the law is; and when their judgment is satisfied, the law, as thus
ascertained, is binding upon them, and should be their guide,
whether it is or is not as they think it ought to be. The jury
were well told that they were the judges of the law under the same
obligations that attach to the judge on the bench. "No one is
wiser than the law," and we may add that no jury, however capable and intelligent they may be, are wiser than the law. The
judge and jury, and all concerned in the administration of justice,
are equally bound by the law. In that way, and that alone, can
persons and property be reasonably protected. In that way, and
that alone, will justice be impartially administered. Any other theory, if practically carried out, will sap the foundations of the government, and render uncertain and capricious the administration of
criminal law. A guilty man will escape through the sympathies
of the jury, while the innocent will be convicted by reason of their
prejudices; and what governs one panel as law, will be repudiated
by another.
We cannot see that the judge on this trial violated these principles. On the contrary, he seemed to appreciate their importance.
He evidently had strong convictions upon the question, and sought
to impress those convictions upon the minds of the jury. He referred to the ststute, to what was understood to be the decision of
the Supreme Court in another case, and to his own opinion. Thus
the jury could see that there were in favor of the constitutionality
of the law, the wisdom and judgment of the legislature, the decision
of the Supreme Court, and the opinion of the presiding judge ; and
that they could only declare it to be unconstitutional by assuming
to be superior in wisdom to all these.
The reference to the principles governing in civil cases was evidently by way of illustration. The jury could not have understood that they were bound by the opinion of the court as in civil
cases, for at the close they were distinctly told that they were the
judges of the law, and that if they conscientiously believed that
the act was unconstitutional they ought to acquit the accused.
We do not advise a new trial.
The question discussed in the forego- tion of criminal law. There seems to
ing opinion is one always of considera- have been, in this country especially,
ble difficulty, and sometimes productive no little conflict of opinion upon the
of great uncertainty in the administra- right of the jury, independently of stat-
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ute, to determine questions of law in
criminal cases. Mr. Justice STORY, in
Unuited States v. Battiste, 2 Sumner 240,
assumes the ground, that the jury arc no
more to be regarded as rightfully judges
of the law in criminal than in civil cases;
and this rule is followed in Commonwealth
v. Porter, 10 Met. 263, State v. Peirce,
1: N. 11. 536, anl numerous other cases
in the state courts, more or less directly
upon the very point of the lawful right
of juries to decide the law in criminal
cases. And on the other hand, Mr. Justice CHASE, in the trial of Fries, Gase's
Trial, by Evans, App. 12, 45, charged
the jury in favor of the right of juries to
decide the law in all criminal cases, upon
their own responsibility. And Mr. Justice BALDWIN, in United States v. Wilson and Porter, I Bald. C. C. 99, took
the same view, which he somewhat modifled in the second trial of the case : Id.
108, and in United States v. Shrive, Id.
510. This view is maintained in a large
number of decisions in the state courts :
State v. Wilkinson, 2 Vt. 48 ; State v.
Croteau, 23 Id. 14 ; State v. Shaw, 6
Shep. 436; Ross v. Com'th, I Gratt. 557 ;
State v. Allen, I MeCord 525 ; Holden
v. State, 5 Ga. 441 ; State v. Armstrong,
4 Blackf. 247. These lists of authorities in favor of either view of the law,
might be very much eltended. They
will be found extensively cited in State
v. Croteau, supra, in the opinion of the
court by Mr. Justice HALL, and in the
dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice BENNETT, both of which are very elaborate
and learned, and characterized by uncommon ability.
But the real difficulty in the case turns

far more upon the wisdom and discretion
of the judge, than upon the abstract
rights of the jury. For since it is clear
the jury have the right to rejudge any
question of law involved in a criminal
cause, and to settle it in their own way,
without regard to the directions of the
court, and thus to acquit the accused hy
a general verdict, upon the mere fancy
that the law is not wise or useful, which
it is easy to dignify by the name of unconstitutional; and such verdict will
be fihal, as the court cannot grant a
new trial after such verdict, and as all
this is confessedly true, there seems no
great use in having much controversy
upon the question whether this is the legitimato right of the jury, or only a
power, 'whichjuries sometimes assert, in
vindication of what they may, rather indefinitely, call justice.
But we apprehend there will never be
much controversy on these points between court and jury where the jury are
fairly and respectfully allowed their proper function in deciding cases. We
know indeed that juries sometimes prove
restive, out of mere conceit, and a false
sense of the imlortance of their own
office ; but this is seldom the case, with
properly educated jurors, unless they are
over educated, a matterwe briefly alluded
to in the late case of State v. Patterson,
ante, Yol. 12. N. S., p. 655.1 We have
said all we desire to say upon this topic
of jurors deciding the law in criminal
cases, in State v. McDonnell, 32 Vt. 491,
531-533, andwe should certainly notfeel
justified in repeating it here.
I. F. R.

I 'we are somewhat surprised that our cotemporsry, the London Solicitors' Journal, should rev..Patterson, as having been uttered by the present
present our comments, In a brief note to MSate
.Judge Rtcrrm of Vermont, in the trial of the cause, (with which he had nothing to do); or that
he shouldsuppose we were still acting as Judge In Vermont (a thingnow far In the past), and need
the same freedom of criticism upon the bench, which we do as a journalist. Whether the misstatement of the matter by our cntomporary was a mere blunder, or was half Intentional, in order to
give epecial point to our stricltures, they certainly were not to his usual good taste. But we think
we have less cause of complaint than others who had nothing to do with eithex the trial or the
strictures, to be thus made responsible for both.

DENNETT v. HOPKINSON.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.
DANIEL DENNETT,

EXECUTOR, V. SAMUEL

IIOPKINSON.

Unharvested crops go to the devisec of the land and not to the executor.

As

against the heirs at law they go to the executor ; but as against a devisee they do

not, unless it appear by the will that the testator so intended.
Hay in a barn passes under a bequest of "all the household furniture and other
articles of personal property in and about the buildings."
NATHAN HOPxiNSoN made his will February 6th 1864, by which
he directed as follows: "First. I give, devise and bequeath to
Nathan Hopkinson, son of my cousin, Samuel Hopkinson, now
residing in the state of Illinois, my homestead farm; also all the
live-stock of all kinds and all the farming utensils, implements and
tools not otherwise disposed of which I may leave at my decease,
to have and to hold to the said Nathan Hopkinson, his heirs and
assigns for ever."
Then followed twenty-two pecuniary legacies to distant relatives,
friends and former employees of the testator and to a literary institution. Then item "24. Until Nathan Hopkinson, named in
the first devise and bequest in this will, shall arrive at the age of
twenty-one years, I give and bequeath the use, improvement and
income of my said farm and of the live-stock and farming-tools,
utensils and'implements to the said Samuel Hopkinson, his father;
provided and on condition that the said Samuel shall keep the
farm, buildings and fences, tools and utensils, in as good order and
condition as when they shall be left by me, and shall keep the
stock good without diminution or depreciation, and shall support
and properly educate said Nathan till he arrives at full age. And
I also give and bequeath all the household furniture and other
articles of personal property in and about the buildings to the
said Samuel, to be used by him till the said Nathan becomes of
age, and afterwafds to the said Nathan as his own property."
By the twenty-fifth clause, the testator declared his intention to
dispose of his whole estate and directed the division of any surplus,
after payment of debts and legacies and satisfying devises, among

those to whom pecuniary bequests are given. The next and final
clause appointed Daniel Dennett executor.
The testator died August 31st 1868, never having been married,
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and having neither parents, brother nor sister. His namesake, to
whom he devised his farm, was living in Illinois with his father,
Samuel Iopkinson, and was then about six years old. The death
of the testator was not communicated to Samuel and his fimily
till October :4th 1868. They came toi Maine and entered upon
possession of the farm and property connected therewith January
19th 1869, and afterwards consumed and sold the hay and other
crops which they found stored in the buildings upon the place.
The item of chief value was the hay, worth several hundred
dollars, which had been cut, and stowed in the barns before August
31st 1868, the day of the testator's death. The other crops, corn,
beans, potatoes, &c., were gathered and placed in the buildings
upon the estate after that date by the plaintiff, claiming to act as
executor. He subsequently demanded these articles of produce,
including the hay, of Samuel Hopkinson, after the latter entered
into possession of the premises; and upon his refusal to deliver
them, or pay for them, this action of trover was commenced, which
was submitted to the court upon the foregoing facts and such inferences as might properly be drawn therefrom. The substance
of the issue was that each party claimed title in himself to the
property in controversy under the above-recited testamentary provisions.
L. B. Dennett, for plaintiff.-This is a question of intention.
The word "1income" in the devise to defendant is preceded by the
words "use and improvement," showing that it is only the income
derived from such use and improvement that is given him, and not
the income already acquired before the testator's death.
The condition attached to the bequest shows this. The hay
does not pass because not eju8dem generis with the articles named.
Edwin B. Smith, for defendant, relied on the distinction between
the rights of a devisee and an heir at law as to crops growing at
the time of the testator's death, citing numerous text writers and
Brest v. llMoore, 8 East 339; Spencer's Gase, Winch Rep. 51,
with many cases in this country, claimed to be analogous, though
not made directly upon this point. As to the hay, lie claimed it
to be in its use for carrying on the estate devised, ejusdem generis
with the articles enumerated.
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The opinion of the court was delivered by
J.-Unharvested crops go to a devisee of the land
and not to the executor. As against the heirs at law they go to
the executor; but as against a devisee they do not.
It is not easy, says Mr. Hargrave, to account for this distinction,
which gives corn growing to the devisee, but denies it to the heir.
Mr. Broom also expresses the same opinion. Lord ELLENBOROUGH
thought the distinction "capricious."
But they all agree that
such is the law.
Mr. Broom's statement of the law is as follows: He says that
where a-tenant in fee or in tail dies after the corn lias been sown,
but before severance, it shall go to his personal representatives
and not to the heir; but if a tenant in fee sows the land and
then devises the land by will and dies before severance, the devisees shall have the corn and not the devisor's executors : Broom's
Legal Maxims, 4th ed. 269.
Lord ELLENBOROUGH'S explanation of the distinction is as follows : He says that in the testator hiinself the standing corn,
though part of the realty, subsists for some purposes as a chattel
interest, which goes on his death to his executors as against the
heirs, though as against the executors it goes to the devisee of the
land, upon the presumption that such was the intention of the devisor in favor of his devisee; but that this presumption may be
rebutted by other words in the will which show an intent that the
executor shall have it: West v. Moore, 8 East 339.
And in a case tried before Chief Justice HOLT, where the question
was whether corn growing passed to the devisee of the land or his
mother, the widow, to whom the testator had bequeathed "all his
goods, chattels, &c., and Mhe 8tock of his farm," the case of
Spencer, Winch 51, was urged, where it was resolved that the
devisee of land sown should have the corn and not the executor of
the devisor; to which it was answered, " That is true, if the intention of the testator does not appear to be otherwise." And
Chief Justice HOLT held that in that case it did appear that the
intention of th testator was otherwise.
It has been doubted whether Chief Justice HoLT's construction
of the will was correct, but the decision is valuable as showing,
first, that the general rule of law is that a devisee of the land will
hold the unharvested crops; second, that the rule is based on the
presumption that such was the intention of the testator ; and
WALTON,
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third, that this presumption may be rebutted by other clauses in the
will showing that such was not his intention : Cox v. Godsalve, 6

East 601, note.
And such we take it is the settled rule where the common law
is in force. It is not only so laid down in the text books and
cases already cited but in many others : Buller's Nisi Prius 34;
Co. Litt. sect. 68, note 2 ; 4 Bac. Ab., Bouvier's ed. 83; 1 Chitty's
General Practice 92; 2 Bl. Com., Sharswood's ed. 122, note 2;
2 Redf. on Wills 141 ; Broom's Legal Maxims, 4th ed. 269;
Gilbert on Ev. 214; Cro. Eliz. 61; Spencer's Case, Winch 51;
Cox v. Godsalve, 6 East 406; 1West v. lloore, 8 Id. 839.
We find on examination that in many of the states this matter
is regulated by statute, but we are not aware of any such statute
in this state. There is a provision that when from any cause
there is a delay in granting letters testamentary, or of administration, a special administrator may be appointed, whose duty it
shall be to collect all the goods, chattels and debts of the deceased,
control and cause to be improved all his real estate, and collect the
rents and profits thereof, and preserve them for the executor or
administrator thereafter appointed, &c.: R. S. c. 64, § 33. And
we find another provision declaring that if any part of the real
estate is used or occupied by the executor or administrator, he
shall account for the income thereof to the devisees or heirs in the
manner ordered by the judge of probate, &c., R. S. c. 64, § 55;
but these provisions were obviously intended for other purposes
and were not designed to change the rule of the common law with
respect to the ownership of unharvested crops. And we are inclined to think the law is best as it is ; that although the rule
which gives to the devisee of the land the unharvested crops and
denies them to the heir at law, may seem to be unphilosophical,
it is nevertheless founded in practical wisdom. Not unfrequently
the heirs at law are mere children, without discretion of their own
to enable them to care for the growing crops, and without legal
guardians to aid them. They are sometimes scattered and far
away. The death of the ancestor may be sudden and the condition of his family such that the crops, unharvested as well as
harvested, may be needed for their immediate support. Will it
not be better, therefore, in the great majority of cases, that all
the crops, the unharvested as well as those that are harvested,
should be regarded as personal property, and go to the adminis-

DENNETT v. HOPKINSON.

trator?

We cannot resist the conviction that it is better that it

should be so.
Not so, however, of a devisee of the land. He is the selected
object of a specific donation. If for any cause it is probable that
he will not be in a condition to take charge of it at the donor's
death, the contingency can be provided for in the will. It is a
matter which the testator would be likely to think of and provide
for if necessary. If there is no such provision and the gift is unconditional, without words of limitation or restraint, we think it
may fairly be presumed that it was the intention of the donor
that his donee should take the land, as a grantee would take it,
with the right to immediate possession and the full enjoyment of
all that is growing upon it, as well the unsevered annual crops, as
the more permanent growth.
In this case the homestead farm of the testator was devised to
his cousin and his cousin's son-the father to have the use, improvement and income of it till the son should arrive at age, who was
then to have it as his own property. There is nothing in the
devising clauses, or in any other part of the will, to rebut the presumption that the devisees were to have the unharvested crops
that might be growing upon it at the time of the testator's death.
On the contrary the presumption is very much strengthened by
the fact that the testator gave all his live-stock and farming tools,
and all his household furniture and all other articles of personal
property in and about the buildings, to the same persons. It is
impossible to except out of these two sweeping clauses any of the
crops, whether harvested and in the barns, or still growing upon
the land unharvested. If harvested and in the barns, they would
pass 'by virtue of that clause in the will which bequeaths all
articles of personal property in and about the buildings. If not
harvested they passed as part and parcel of the realty.
The result is that this action, which is trover by the executor
against one of the devisees named for the conversion of these
same crops to his own use, cannot be maintained. As against the
executor the defendant's was the better title.
Judgment for defendant.

BROWN v. COLLINS.

Supreme Judicial Court of New Iamp8hire.
BROWN v. COLLINS.
A person whose horses, frightened by a locomotive, became uncontrollable, ran
away with him, went upon land of another, and broko a post there, is not liable
for the damage if it was not caused by any fault on his part.

TRESPASS by Albert II. Brown against Lester Collins to recover
the value of a stone post, on which was a street lamp, situated in
front of his place of business, in the village of Tilton. The post
stood upon plaintiff's land, but near the southerly line of the main
highway leading through the village, and within four feet of said
line. There was nothing to indicate the line of the highway, nor
any fence, or other obstruction, between the highway as travelled
and the post.
The highway crosses the railroad near the place of accident, and
the stone post stood about fifty feet from the railroad track at the
crossing. The defendant was in the highway, at or near the railroad crossing, with a pair of horses, loaded with grain, going to
the grist-mill in Tilton. The horses became frightened by an engine on the railroad near the crossing, and by reason thereof became unmanageable, and ran, striking the post with the end of the
pole, and breaking it off near the ground, destroying the lamp with
the post. No other injury was done by the accident. The shock
produced by the collision with the post threw the defendant from
his seat in the wagon, and he struck on the ground between the
horses, but suffered no injury except a slight concussion. Th6
defendant was in the use of ordinary care and skill in managing
his team, until they became frightened as aforesaid.
The foregoing facts were agreed upon for the purpose of raising
the question of the right of plaintiff to recover in this action.
Rogers, for the plaintiff.
Barnardand Sanborn, for the defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
DoE, J.-It is agreed the defendant was in the use of ordinary
care and skill in managing his horses, until they were frightened;
and that they then became unmanageable, and ran against and
broke a post on the plaintiff's land. It is not explicitly stated

BROWN v. COLLINS.

that the defendant was without actual fault, that he was not guilty
of any malice or unreasonable unskilfulness or negligence, but it
is to be inferred that the fact was so, and we decide the case on
that ground. We take the case as one where, without actual fault
in the defendant, his horses broke from his control, ran away with
him, went upon the plaintiff's land, and did damage there against
the will, intent and desire of the defendant.
Sir THOMAS RAYMOND'S report of Lambert & Olliot v. Bessey,
T. Raym. 421 ; and Bes8ey v. Olliot & Lambert, T. Raym. 467, is,
"The question was this: A gaoler takes from the bailiff a prisoner
arrested by him out of the bailiff's jurisdiction. Whether the
gaoler be liable to an action of false imprisonment ? And the
judges of the Common Pleas did all hold that he was, and of that
opinion I am, for these reasons:"I. In all civil acts, the law doth not so much regard the intent of the actor, as the loss and damage of the party suffering;
and therefore, Mich. 6 E. 4, 7 a. pl. 18. Trespass quare vi et
armis clausum .fregit, et herbam suam pedibvv caleando consumpsit in six acres. The defendant pleads that he hath an acre lying
next the said six acres, and upon it a hedge of thorns; and he cut
the thorns, and they, ipso invite, fell updn the plaintiff's land, and
the defendant took them off as soon as he could, which is the same
trespass; and the plaintiff demurred; and adjudged for the plaintiff; for though a man doth a lawful thing, yet if any damage do
thereby befall another, he shall answer for it, if he could have
avoided it. As, if a man lop a tree, and the boughs fall upon
another ipso invito, yet an action lies. If a man shoot at butts,
and hurt another unawares, an action lies. I have land through
which a river runs to your mill, and I lop the fallows growing
upon the river side, which accidentally stops the water so as your
mill is hindered, an action lies. If I am building my own house,
and a piece of timber falls on my neighbor's house and breaks
part of it, an action lies. If a man assault me, and I lift up my
staff to defend myself, and in lifting it up, hit another, an action lies
by that person, and yet I did a lawful thing. And the reason of
all these cases is, because he that i3 damaged ought to be recompensed. But otherwise it is in criminal cases, for there adtus non
facit reum nisi mens sit rea.
" Guilbert v. Sfone, Mich. 23 Car. 1, B. R.; Stile 72. Trespass for entering his close, and tnlking away his horse. The defendant -pleads that he, for fear or his life, by threats of twelve
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men, went into the plaintiff's close and took the horse. The plaintiff demurred, and adjudged for the plaintiff, because threats could
not excuse the defendant, and make satisfaction to the plaintiff.
" Weaver v. Ward, Hob. 134. Trespass of assault and battery.
The defendant pleads that lie was a trained soldier in London, and
he and the plaintiff were skirmishing with their company, and the
defendant, with his musket, casualiter et per infortuniam et contra
voluntatem suam, in discharging of his gun hurt the plaintiff, and
resolved no good plea. So here, though the defendant knew not
of the wrongful taking of the plaintiff, yet that will not make any
recompense for the wrong the plaintiff hath sustained * * * But
the three other judges resolved that the defendant, the gaoler,
could not be charged, because he could not have notice whether
the prisoner was legally arrested or not."
In -Fletcher v. .Rylands, L. R. 3 H. L. 330, Lord ORANWORT1H
said, "In considering whether a defendant is liable to a plaintiff
for damage which the plaintiff may have sustained,- the question
in general is not whether the defendant has acted with due care
and caution, but whether his acts have occasioned the damage.
This is all well explained in the old case of Lambert v. Besaey,

T. Raym. 421, reported by Sir

THoMAs RAYMOND,

and the doc-

trine is founded on good sense. For when one person, in managing
his own affairs, causes, however innocently, damage to another,
it is obviously only just that he should be the party to suffer."
The bead-note of Weaver v. Ward, Hob. 134, is, "If one
trained soldier wound another in skirmishing for exercise, an action
of trespass will lie, unless it shall appear, from the defendant's plea,
that lie was guilty of no negligence, and that the injury was inevitable." The reason of the decision, as reported, was this: "For lough
it were agreed that if men tilt or tourney in the presence of the
king, or if two masters of defence, playing their prizes, kill one
another, that this shall be no felony, or if a lunatic kill a man, or
the like; because felony must be done animo felonico. Yet ii
trespass, which tends only to give damages according to hurt or
loss, it is not so; and therefore if a lunatic hurt a man he shall
be answerable in trespass; and therefore no man shall be accused
of a trespass (for this is the nature of an excuse, and not of a
justification, pro ut ei bene licuit), except it may be judged utterly
without his fault; as if a man by force take my hand and strike
you ; or if here the defen'lant had said that the plaintiff ran across
his piece when it was discharging ; or had set forth the case with
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the circumstances, so as it had appeared to the court that it had
been inevitable, and that the defendant had committed no negligence to give occasion to the hurt."
There may be some ground to argue, that "utterly without his
fault," "inevitable," and "no negligence," in the sense intended
in that case, mean no more than the modern phrase "ordinary and
reasonable care and prudence"; and that, in such a case, at the
present time, to hold a plea good that alleges the exercise of reasonable care, without setting forth all "the circumstances" or evidence sustaining the plea, would be substantially in compliance
with the law of that case, due allowance being made for tfhe difference
of legal language used at different periods, and the difference in
the forms of pleading. But the drift of the ancient English authorities on the law of torts, seems to differ materially from the view now
prevailing in this country. Formerly in England there seems to
have been no well-defined test of an actionable tort. Defendants
were often held liable "because," as Raymond says, "lie that is
damaged ought to be recompensed": and not because, upon some
clearly stated principle of law founded on actual culpability, public policy, or natural justice, he was entitled to compensation from
the defendant. The law was supposed to regard "the loss and
damage of the party suffering," more than the negligence and
blameworthiness of the defendants : but how much more it regarded
the former than the latter, was a question not settled, and very
little investigated. "The loss and damage of the party suffering,"
if without relief, would be a hardship to him; relief compulsorily
furnished by the other party, would often be a hardship to him :
when and why the "loss and damage" should, and when and why
they should not, be transferred from one to the other, by process
of law, were problems not solved in a philosophical manner. There
were precedents, established upon superficial, crude aind undigested notions : but no application of the general system of legal
reason to this subject.
.Mr. Holmes says, "It may safely be stated that all the more
ancient examples are traceable to conceptions of a nmuch ruder
sort (than actual fault), and in modern times to more or less definitely thought-out views of public policy. The old writs in trespass did not allege, nor was it necessary to show, anything savoring
of culpability. It was enough that a certain event had happened,
and it was not even necessary that the act should be done intentionally, though innocently. An accidental blow was as good a
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cause of action as an i,,tcntional one. On the other hand, when,
as in 1tyland. v. Fletcher, modern courts hold a1man liable for the
escape of water fr.ix a reservoir which he has built upon his land,
or for the"escape or cattle, although he is not alleged to have been
negligent, they do not proceed upon the ground that there is an
element of culpability in making such a reservoir, or in keeping
cattle sufficient to charge the defendant as soon as a dannum
occurs, but on the principle that it is politic to make those who go
into extra-hazardous employments to take the risk on their own
shoulders." lie alludes to the fact that "there is no certainty
what will be thought extra-hazardous in a certain jurisdiction at
a certain time," but suggests that many particular instances point
to the general principle of liability for the consequences of extrahazardous undertakings as the tacitly-assumed ground of decision:
7 Am. Law Rev. 652, 658, 662; 2 Kent Com. 12th ed. 561, n. 1;
4 Id. 110, it. 1. If the hazardous nature of things or of acts is
adopted as the test or one of the tests, and the English authorities are taken as the standard of what is to be regarded as hazardous, "it will be necessary to go the length of saying that an owner
of real property is liable for all damage resulting to his neighbor's
property from anything done upon his own land," (Mellish's argument in Fletclter v. Rylands, L. R. 1 Ex. 272,) and that an
individual is answerable "who, for his own benefit, makes an improvement on his own land according to his best skill and diligence,
and not foreseeing it will produce any injury to his neighbor if
he thereby unwittingly injure his neighbor :" GIBBS, C. J., in
Lutton v. Clarke, 6 Taunt. 44; approved by BLACKBURN, J., in
Fletcher v. R]ylands, L. R. 1 Ex. 286. If danger is adopted as a
test, and the English authorities are abandoned, the fact of danger
controverted in each case will present a question for the jury, and
expand the issue of tort or no tort into a question of reasonableness in a form niuch broader than has been generally u.ed; or
courts will be left to devise tests of peril under varying influences
of time and place that may not immediately produce a uniform,
consistent and permanent rule.
It would seem that some of the early English decisions were
based on a view as narrow as that which regards nothing but the
hardship "of the party suffering ;" disregards the question whether
by transferring the hardship to the other party anything more will
be done than substitute one sufferini, party for another; and does
not consider what legal reason can be given for relieving the party
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who has suffered by making another suffer the expense of his
r6lief. For some of those decisions better reasons may now be
given than were thought of when the decisions were announced,
but whether a satisfactory test of an actionable tort can be extracted from the ancient authorities; and whether the few modern
cases that carry out the doctrine of those authorities as far as it
is carried in Fletcher v. .Rylands, 3 H. & 0. 774; L. R. 1 Ex.
265, L. R. 3 H. L. 830, can be sustained, is very doubtful. The
current of American authority is very strongly against some of
the leading English cases.
One of the strongest presentations of the extreme English view,
is by BLACKBURN, J., who says in Fletcher v. Bylands, L. R. 1 Ex.
278, 280, 281, 282: "We think that the true rule of law is, that
the person who for his own purposes, brings on his lands, and
collects and keeps there, anything likely to do mischief if it escapes,
must keep it in at his peril, and, if he does not do so, is primd
facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape. He can excuse himself by showing that the
escape was owing to the plaintiff's default: or perhaps that the
escape was the consequence of vis major or the act of God; but as
nothing of this sort exists here, it is unnecessary to inquire what
excuse would be sufficient. The general rule, as above stated,
seems, on principle, just. The person whose grass or corn is eaten
down by the escaping cattle of his neighbor, or whose mine is
flooded by the water from his neighbor's reservoir, or whose cellar
is invaded by the filth of his neighbor's privy, or whose habitation
is made unhealthy by the fumes and noisome vapors of his neighbor's alkali works, is damnified without any fault of his own: and
it seems but reasonable and just, that the neighbor who has brought
something on his own property which was not naturally there, harmless to others, so long as it is confined to his own property, but
which he knows to be mischievous if it gets on his neighbor's, should
be obliged to make good the damage which ensues if he does not
succeed in confining it to his own property. But for his act in
bringing it there, no mischief could have accrued, and it seems but
just that he should at his peril keep itthere so that no mischief
may accrue or answer for the natural and anticipated consequences.
And upon authority, this we think is established to be the law,.
whether the things so brought be beasts, or water, or filth, or
stenches. The case that has most commonly occurred and which
VOL. XXII.-25
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is most frequently to be found in the books, is as to the obligation
of the owner of cattle which he has brought on his land to prevent
their escaping and doing mischief. The law as to them seems to
be perfectly settled from early times: the owner must keep them
in at his peril, or he will be answerable for the natural consequences
of their escape; that is with regard to tame beasts. For the grass
they cat and trample upon, though not for any injury to the person
of others, for our ancestors have settled that it is not the general
nature of horses to kick, or bulls to gore (or he might ha- e added,
dogs to bite), but if the owner knows that the beast has a vicious
propensity to attack man, he will be answerable for that too. * * *
In these latter authorities (relating to animals called mischievous
or ferocious), the point under consideration was damages to the
person, and what was decided was, that where it was known that
hurt to the person was the natural consequence of the animal being
loose, the owner should be responsible in damages for such hurt,
though where it was not known to be so, the owner was not responsible for such damages, but where the damage is like eating grass
or other ordinary ingredients in damage feasant, the natural consequences of the escape, the rule as to keeping in the animal is the
same. * * *. There does not appear to be any difference in
principle, between the extent of the duty cast on him who brings
cattle on his land to keep them in and the extent of the duty imposed on him, who brings on his land water filth or stenches or
any other thing which will, if it escape, naturally do damage, to
prevent their escaping and injuring his neighbor."
This seems to be substantially an adoption of the early authorities, and an extension of the ancient practice of holding the defendant liable in some cases on the partial view that regarded the
misfortune of the plaintiff upon whom a damage had fallen, and required no legal reason for transferring the damage to the defendant. The ancient rule was, that a person in whose house, or on
whose land, a fire accidentally originated which spread to his
neighbor's property and destroys it, must make good the loss:
Pilliter v. Phippard,11 A. & E. (N. S.) 347, 354; Tubervil v.
Stamp, 1 Comyns 32, s.c. 1 Salk. 13 ; Com: Dig. Action upon
the case for negligence, (A. C.); 1 Arch. N. P. 539; Pletcher v.
1lands, 3 11. & 0. 790, 793; Russell v. Fab ]an, 34 N. H. 218,
225. No inquiry was made into the reason of putting upon him
his neighbor's loss as well as his own. The rule of such cases is
applied by BLACKBURN to everything which a man brings on his
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land which will, if it escape, naturally do damage. One result of
such a doctrine is, that every one building a fire on his own hearth
for necessary purposes with the utmost care, does so at the peril,
not only of losing his own house, but of being irretrievably ruined
if a spark from his chimney starts a conflagration which lays waste
the neighborhood. "In conflict with the rule as laid down in the
English cases is a class of cases in reference to damage from fire
communicated from the adjoining premises. Fire, like water or
steam, is likely to produce mischief if it escapes and goes beyond
control; and yet it has never been held in this country that one
building a fire upon his own premises can be made liable if it escapes upon his neighbor's premises and does him damage without
proof of negligence :" Losee v. Buchanan, 51 iN. Y. 476, 487.
Everything that a man can bring on his land is capable of escaping against his will and without his fault; with or without
assistance in some form, solid, liquid or gaseous, changed or unchanged by the transforming processes of nature or art, and of
doing damage after its escape. Moreover, if there is a legal principle that makes a man liable for the natural consequences of the
escape of things which he brings on his land, the application of
such a principle cannot be limited to those things. It must be
applied to all his acts that disturb the original order of creation,
or at least to all things which he undertakes to possess or control
anywhere, and which were not used and enjoyed in what is called
the natural or primitive condition of mankind, whatever that may
have been. This is going back a long way for a standard of legal
rights, and adopting an arbitrary test of responsibility that confounds all degrees of danger; pays no heed to the essential elements of actual fault; puts a clog upon natural and reasonablynecessary uses of matter, and tends to embarrass and obstruct
much of the work which it seems to be man's duty carefully to do.
The distinction made by Lord OAIRNS, BIlands v. Pletcher,L. R.
3 H. L. 330, between a natural and a non-natural use of land, if
he meant anything more than the difference between a reasonable
use and an unreasonable one, is not established in the law. Even
if the arbitrary test were applied only to things which a man
brings on his land, it would still recognise the peculiar rights of
savage life in a wilderness; ignore the rights growing out of a
civilized state of society, and make a distinction not warranted by
the enlightened spirit of the common law; it would impose a
penalty upon efforts made in a reasonable, skilful and careful
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manner to rise above a condition of barbarism.

It is impossible

that legal principle can throw so serious an obstacle in the way of
progress and improvement. Natural rights are, in general, legal
rights; and the rights of civilization are, in a legal sense, as
natural as any others. " Most of the rights of property, as well
as of person, in the social state are not absolute but relative ;"
Losee v. Buctan an, 51 N. Y. 485; and if men ever were in any
other than the social state, it is neither necessary nor expedient
that they should now govern themselves on the theory that they
ought to live in some other state. The common law does not
usually establish tests of responsibility on any other basis than the
propriety of their living in the social state, and the relative and
qualified character of the rights incident to that state.
In Fletcher v. 1ylands, L. R. I Ex. 286, 287, Mlr. Justice
BLACKBURN, commenting upon the remark of Mr. Baron MARTIN,
"that when damage is done to personal property, or even to the
person, by collision, either upon land or at sea, there must be negligence in the party doing the damage to render him legally
responsible," says, "This is no doubt true, and as was pointed
out by Mr. .lfellish during his argument before us, this is not confined to cases of collision, for there are many cases in which
proof of negligence is essential, as for instance, when an unruly
horse gets on the footpath of a public street and kills a passenger,
(ifammack v. Wtite, 11 0. B. N. S. 588, 81 L. J. 0. P. 129), or
where a person in a dock is struck by the falling of a balG of
cotton, which the defendants' servants are lowering, (Scott v.
London Dock Company, 8 H. & C. 596, 35 L. J. (Ex.) 17, 220),
and many other similar cases may be found. But we think these
cases distinguishable from the present. Traffic on the highways,
whether by land or sea, cannot be conducted without exposing
those whose persons or property are near it to some inevitable
risk; and that being so, those who go on the highway, or have
their property adjacent to it, may well be held to do so, subject
to their taking upon themselves the risk of injury from that inevitable danger; and persons who, by the license of the owner, pass
near to warehouses where goois are being raised or lowered,
certainly do so subject to the inevitable risk of accident. In
neither case, therefore, can they recover without proof of want
of care or skill occasioning the accident; and it is believed that
all the cases in which inevitable accident has been held an excuse
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for what, prinid facie, was a trespass, can be explained on the
same principle, viz.: that the circumstances were such as to show
that the plaintiff had taken that risk upon himself." This would
be authority for holding, in the present case, that the plaintiff, by
having his post near the street, took upon himself the risk of its
being broken by an inevitable accident, carrying a traveller off
the street. But such a doctrine would open more questions and
more difficult ones than it would settle. At what distance from a
highway, would an object be near it ? What part of London is
not near a street? And then as the defendant had as good a
right to be at home with his horses, as to be in the highway, why
might not his neighbor, by electing to live in an inhabited country,
as well be held to take upon himself the risk of an inevitable
accident happening by reason of the country being inhabited, as
to assume a highway risk by living near a road? If neighborhood
is the test, who are a man's neighbors, but the whole human race ?
If a person by remaining in England, is held to take upon himself one class of the inevitable dangers of that country because
lie could avoid that class by migrating to a region of solitude, why
should he not, for a like reason, also be held to voluntarily expose
himself to other classes of the inevitable dangers of that country ?
And where does this reasoning end?
It is not improbable that the rules of liability for damage, done
by brutes or by fire, found in the early England cases, were introduced by sacerdotal influence, from what was supposed to be the
Roman or the Hebrew law: 7 Am. L. Rev. 652 note; 1 Domat
Civil Law (Strahan's translation, 2d ed.) 804, 805, 806, 812, 313;
Exodus xxi, 28-32, 36; xxii, 5, 6, 9. It would not be singular if these rules should be spontaneously produced, at a certain
period in the life of any community. Where they first appeared
is of little consequence in the present inquiry. They were certainly introduced in England, at an immature stage of English
jurisprudence and an undeveloped state of agriculture, manufactures and commerce, when the nation bad not settled down to
those modern, progressive, industrial pursuits which the spirit of
the common law adapted to all conditions of society, encourages
and defends. They were introduced when the development of
many of the rational rules, now universally recognised as principles of the common law, had not been demanded by the growth
of intelligence, trade and productive enterprise, when the common
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law had not been set forth in the precedents as a coherent and
logical system on many subjects, other than the tenures of real
estate. At all events, whatever may be said of the origin of those
rules, to extend them as they were extended in Rylands v. Fletcher
seems to us contrary to the analogies and the general principles
,of the common law, as now established. To extend them to the
present case, would be contrary to American authority, as well as
to our understanding of legal principles.
The difficulty under which the plaintiff might labor, in proving
the culpability of the defendant, which is sometimes given as a
reason for imposing an absolute liability, without evidence of negligence, (lMrford v. Smith, 52 N. H. 355, 359), or changing the
burden of proof, (Lisbon v. Lyman, 49 N. H. 553, 568, 569,
574, 575), seems not to have been given in the English cases
relating to damage done by brutes or fire. And, however large
or small the class of cases in which such a difficulty may be
the foundation of a rule of law, since the difficulty has been so
much reduced by the abolition of witness disabilities, the present
ease is not one of that class.
There are many cases where a man is held liable for taking, converting, (C. R. Co. v. Foster, 51 N. II. 490), or destroying property, or doing something else, or causing it to be done, intentionally, under a claim of right, and without any actual fault.
"1Probably one-half of the cases, in which trespass de bonis asportatis is maintained, arise from a mere misapprehension of legal
rights." METCALF, J., in Stanley v. Gaylord, 1 Cush. 536, 551.
When a defendant erroneously supposed, without any fault of
either party, that he had a right to do what he did, and his act,'
done in the assertion of his supposed right, turns out to have been
an interference with the plaintiff's property, he is generally held
to have assumed the risk of maintaining the right which he asserted and the responsibility of the natural consequences of his
voluntary act. But when there was no fault on his part, and the
damage was not caused by his voluntary and intended act; or by
an act of which he knew, or ought to have known, the damage
would be a necessary, probable or natural consequence; or by an
act which he knew, or ought to have known to be unlawful ; we
understand the general rule to be, that he is not liable. In Brown
v. Kendall, 6 Cush. 292, the defendant having interfered to part
his dog and the plaintiff's which were fighting, in raising a stick
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for that purpose, accidentally struck the plaintiff, and injured
him. It was held, that parting the dogs was a lawful and proper
act, which the defendant might do, by the use of proper and safe
means; and that if the plaintiff's injury was caused by such an
act done with due care, and all proper precautions, the defendant
was not liable. In the decision, there is the important suggestion
that some of the apparent confusion in the authorities has arisen
from discussions of the question whether a party's remedy is in
trespass or case, and from the statement, that when the injury
comes from a direct act, trespass lies, and when the damage is
consequential, case is the proper form of action, the remark concerning the immediate effect of an act, being made with reference
to damage for which it is admitted there is a remedy of some kind,
and on the question of the proper remedy, not on the general
question of liability. Judge SHAw, delivering the opinion of the
court, said: "We think as the result of all the authorities, the
rule is correctly stated by Mr. Greenleaf, that the plaintiff must
come prepared with evidence to show either that the intention was
unlawful, or that the defendant 'was in fault; for if the injury
was unavoidable, and the conduct of the defendant was free from
blame, he will not be liable: 2 Greenl. Ev., §§ 85 to 92; Wakefield v. Robinson, 1 Bing. 213. If, in the prosecution of a lawful
act, a casualty purely accidental arises, no action can be supported
for an injury arising therefrom: Davis v. S'aunders, 2 Chit. R.
639; Coin. Dig. Battery, A. (Day's ed.) and notes: Vincent v.
Stinehour, 7 Verm. 62; James v. Campbell, 5 C. & P. 372;
Ablerson v. Tfaistell, 1 0. & K. 358."
Whatever may be the rule, or the exception, or the reason of it,
in cases of insanity (Weaver v. Ward, Hob. 134; Coin. Dig.
Battery, A, note a, Hammond's ed. ; Dormay v. Barradaile,5 M.
G. & S. 380; Sedgwick on Damages 455, 456, 2d ed.; 11orse v.
Crawford, 17 Vt. 499; -Dickinson v. Barber, 9 Mass. 225;
Krom v. Sehoomaker, 3 Barb. 647; Torner v. 11larshall, 5 Munf.
466 ; Feates v. Reed, 4 Blackf. 463), and whatever may be the full
legal definitions of necessity, inevitable danger, and unavoidable
accident, the occurrence complained of in this case, was one for
which the defendant is not liable unless every one is liable for all
damage done by superior force overpowering him and using him
or his property as an instrument of violence. The defendant being
without fault, was as innocent as if the pole of his wagon had been
hurled on the plaintiffs land by a whirlwind, or he himself, by a
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stronger man, had been thrown through the plaintiff's window.
Upon the facts stated, taken in the sense in which we understood
them, the defendant is entitled to judgment. I Illard on Torts,
ch. 3, 3d ed. ; Losee v. Buchanan,51 N. Y. 476 ; Parrotv. Well8,
15 Wall. 524, 537; Roche v. 3. (. L. Co., 5 Wis. 55; Eastman
Co., 44 N. II. 143, 156.
Case discharged.
€t

Supreme CGourt of Indiana.
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF TIPPECANOE COUNTY v.
REYNOLDS.
In the management or the property, business or affairs of a corporation by the
president or directors thereof, they occupy a relation to the stockholders similar
to that of trustees to cestuis que trust.
Stock in a corporation is the individual property of the owner, which he may
sell or dispose of, like any other property, as he may see proper ; and the president and directors have no control, power or dominion over it, and no duty to
perform in reference to its sale, unless it be to see t hat proper books and facilities

are furnished for its transfer.
In the purchase of stock by a director or president of a corporation from a
stockholder, the relation of trustee and "stui que trust does not exist between them.

TiIIs was an action by the appellant against the appellee, commenced in the Tippecanoe Circuit Court, and transferred, on
change of venue, to the White Circuit Court.
The facts in the case, as alleged, were in substance as follows:
The county of Tippecanoe was the owner of 570 paid-up shares
of the capital stock of the Lafayette and Indianapolis Railroad
Company of fifty dollars each, amounting to $28,500. On June
24th 1865, the total amount of the stock of the company was only
$250,000. The road had been built mainly from the proceeds of
bonds sold, and had by its earnings paid I off the bonded debt, and
also the floating debt was paid, or means accumulated and on hand
with which to pay it. The stock owned by the county vas at that
time worth $342,000. The defendant was the president of the
company and the principal manager of its affairs.
It was alleged by plaintiff that the condition of the company
had been concealed by the defendant by failing to declare dividends, and by representations that the stock was not worth its
face, and by failing to show the condition of the affairs of the
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company. That the plaintiffs were ignorant of the value of the
stock, which the defendant knew.
That he represented that the depreciation of the value of the
stock had been caused by losses sustained by the company, when
he knew that the accumulations of the company were sufficient to
pay all debts and losses, and leave the stock eleven hundred per
cent. above par. That under these circumstances the defendant,
through his agent, Moses Fowler, wfio was also a director of the
company, purchased the stock of the county on said 24th day of
June 1865, for the sum of $25,650, being ninety cents on the
dollar, and had it transferred to one Wilson to hold as his trustee.
That the defendant was the.n negotiating to sell the road to the
Indianapolis and Cincinnati Railroad Company, and afterwards
did sell it for $2,500,000, secured by first-mortgage bonds on the
road from Lafayette to Indianapolis, with a. further lien on the
Indianapolis and Cincinnati road.
Prayer for judgment for $315,850 in different forms and for
general relief.
Moses Fowler was originally made a defendant, but as to him
the action was dismissed.
"Reynolds answered by general denial, and the cause was tried
by the court, who made what purported to be a special finding,
but which was regarded by the court above as only a general finding, it not appearing to have been made at the request of either
party, and not being signed by the judge, and no conclusions of
law stated.
The plaintiff moved for a new trial because:-I
"1. The finding is contrary to law.
"2. It is not supported by sufficient evidence."
The court overruled this motion, and the plaintiff excepted.
Final judgment was then rendered for the defendant on the finding.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
WORDEN, J.-Several errors are assigned, but only three of
them are presented and relied upon
1. The striking out of a part of the prayer of the complaint.
2. Overruling the motion for judgment on the special finding.
3. Overruling the motion for a new trial.
As to the first point made we think the prayer of the complaint,
after striking out the parts referred to in the motion, was sufficient
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to authorize the court to give the plaintiff any relief to which he
might be entitled under the facts alleged.
There was a prayer fir judgment for a specific amount and for
general relief. It is decided that when the defendant answers any
relief may be granted consistent with the case made by the complaint: lanlove v. Lewis, 9 Ind. 194; Besor v. Besor, Id. 847.
With regard to the second point, we have already seen that the
special finding was not made at the request of either party; was
not signed by the judge ; contains no conclusions of law, and, we
may add, is not set out in any bill of exceptions. We can, therefore, only regard it as a general finding for the defendant, inasmuch as the court rendered judgment upon it for the defendant:
Te Peoria, &e., Co. v. Walsor, 22 Ind. 78 ; Smith v. Jeffries, 25
Ind. 377; -Davisv. Franklin, Id. 407.
The merits of the entire case, however, arise upon the question
involved in the overruling of the motion for a new trial, which we
now proceed to consider, the evidence being in the record.
We may remark here that we have had the benefit of a full and
able argument on both sides, both oral and written, by which our
labors have been lightened, and we have been greatly assisted in
arriving at our conclusions in the case. We have carefully considered the evidence in the cause, and are satisfied that no actual
fraud was established in the purchase of the stock by the defendant from the plaintiff. The defendant doubtless knew much more
about the- condition of the affairs of the company and the value of
the stock, both present and prospective, than the plaintiff. He
pulkhased the stock greatly below its real value, as subsequent
events established, but he paid the market value at the time, so
far as it seems to have had a market value. Had the defendant
not been connected with the company as one of its officers, there
is nothing in the case that would furnish any reasonable ground
to claim that the purchase was in any manner infected with fraud.
It is not shown by the evidence that there was any special trust or
confidence reposed in the defendant by the plaintiffs, which was
Yiolated by the former, or of which he took advantage.
These are the conclusions at which we arrive from the evidence,
which is quite voluminous, and cannot be set out without extending
this opinion to an inadmissible length. It is very clear, according
to the well-established practice of the court, that we cannot disturb
the finding of the court below on the ground of actual fraud.
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Some other element must enter into the case in order to justify us
in disturbing the finding. This brings us to the question which
has been chiefly argued by counsel, viz. : Was the defendant, in
consequence of being a director and the president of the company,
a trustee of the plaintiff as a stockholder, whereby it became his
duty as a purchaser of the stock to pay a fair and adequate price
for it; to take no advantage of the relation which he bore to the
company, or the knowledge acquired thereby, and to disclose to
the plaintiff all the material facts within his knowledge, not known
to the plaintiff, affecting the value of the stock ?
We are of the opinion, upon an examination of such authorities
as have been brought to our notice upon the point, that the relation
of trustee and cestui que trust does not exist in such case. It is
said very frequently in the books that the directors of a corporation
are trustees of the stockholders, and that the relation of trustee
and cestui que trust, with its consequences, exists between them.
But these expressions must always be understood to have relation
to the cases to which they are applied, and not to be of universal
application.
It may be conceded that in respect to the property of the corporation, whether it be land, money, securities, capital stock or other
property held by the corporation, and the management of its business, the directors are trustees for the stockholders. The action
of the directors in respect to the property of the corporation, must
affect, to a greater or less de,ree, the stockholders generally. It
has been generally in such cases, or where the action of the directors has affected the whole body of stockholders, that the relation
of trustee and cestui que trust has been held to exist. In a late
case in Pennsylvania, Spering's Appeal, 71 Penna. St. 11-20,
SHARSWOOD, J., in delivering the opinion of the court says, " It is
by no means a well settled point what is the precise relation which
directors sustain to stockholders. They are undoubtedly said in
many authorities to be trustees, but that as I apprehend is only
in a general sense, as we term an agent or any bailee intrusted
with the care and management of the property of another. It is
certain that they are not technical trustees."
To show the diversity of language employed in different cases,
ond the necessity of keeping in view the case to which it is applied,
we make a short extract from the case of Smith v. Hlurd, 12 Met.
871. It was an action on the case at common law, brought by an
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individual holder of shares iii an incorporated bank, against the
directors, setting forth various acts of negligence and malfeasance
through a Slies of years in ConSequenceU
of which, as the declaration alleged, the whole capital of the bank was wasted and lost,
and the shares of the plaintiff became of no value.
SEIAw, C. J., in delivering the opinion of the court said:
"There is no legal privity, relation, or immediate connection between the holders of shares in a bank, in their individual capacity
on the one side, and the directors of the bank on the other. The
directors are not the bailees, the factors, agents or trustees of such
individual stockholders." It was held that the action could not be
maintained.
A similar decision was made in the case of Allen v. Custis, 26
Conn. 456. ELLSWORTH, J., in pronouncing the decision of the
court said: "Besides, the directors of the bank are the agents of
the bank. The bank is the only principal, and there is no such
trust for, or relation toa stockholder as has been claimed by the
plaintilf. The entire duty of the directors, growing out of their
agency is owed to the bank, which, under the charter, is the sole
representative of the stockholders, and the legal protector and defender of their property."
It seems to us, however, keeping in view the current of authorities, that notwithstanding the general language employed in the
above cases, for some'purposes the directors of a corporation stand
in a relation similar to that of trustees for the shareholders. This
seems to be the case in refcr-nce to the management by the directors of the property aid general affairs of tle corporation. These
are matters usually intrusted to the directors, and in respect to
which they are empowered to act, and their action affects the whole
body of shareholders beneficiary or injuriously in respect to dividends upon, or the value of their stock.
But stock in a corporation held by an individual is his own private property, which he may sell or dispose of as he sees proper,
a d over which neither the corporation nor its officers have any
control. It is the subject of daily commerce, and is bought and
sold in market like any other marketable commodity.
The directors have no control or dominion over it whatever: or
duty to discharge in reference to its sale and transfer, unless it be
to see that proper books and facilities are furnished for that purposes. As the property of the individual holder, he holds it as
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free from the dominion and control of the directors as he does his
lands or other property. This view is very well illustrated by what
was said in the case of Iran Allen v. The Assessors, 3 Wall. 573,
in which it was held that shares in the national banks might be
taxed by the states. Mr. Justice NELSON, in delivering the opinion of the court, p. 583, said "But, in addition to this view, the tax
on tha shares is a tax on the capital of the bank. The corporation
is the legal owner of all the property of the bank, real .nd personal; and within the powers conferred upon it by the charter, and
for the purposes of which it was created, can deal with the corporate property as absolutely as a private individual can deal with
his own."
This is familiar law, and will be found in every work that may
be opened on the subject of corporations. A striking exemplification
may be seen in the case of the Queen v. Arnaud, 9 A. & E. (N. S.)
806. The question related to the registry of a ship owned by a
corporation. Lord DENMAN observed, "It appears to me that the
British corporation is, as such, the, sole owner of the ship. The
individual members of the corporation are no doubt interested in
one sense in the property of the corporation, as they may derive individual benefits from its increase or loss from its decrease: but in no
legal sense are the individual members the owners."
"The interest of the shareholder entitles him to participate in
the net profits earned by the bank in the employment of its capi.tal, during the existence of its charter in proportion to the number
of his shares ; and upon its dissolution or termination, to his proportion of the property that may remain of the corporation after
the payment of its debts. This is a distinct independent interest
or property, held by the shareholders, like any other property that
may belong to him. Now it is this interest which the Act of Congress has left subject to taxation by the states," &c.
Such being the nature of the interest of the stockholder in his
stock, and the director having no control, power or dominion over
it, or duty to discharge in reference to it beyond the duty devolving upon him to prudently manage the affairs and property of
the corporation itself, it seems to us to be very clear that, in the
purchase of stock by a director from the holder, the relation of
trustee and cestui que trust does not exist between them.
The case of Carpenterv. Danforth, 52 Barb. 582, a very wellconsidered case, is directly in point.
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There Danforth, who was one of the trustees or directors of the
corporation, purchased of the plaintiff 136 shares of the stock of
the National Bank Note Company, and the purpose of the action
was to have the sale declared void, and to have the plaintiff restored to the rights and interests which he would have had if the
sale had not been made, upon the ground of fraud and undue
influence. It was held, that the relation of trustee and cestui que
trust did not exist.
Many cases have been cited in which it has been said that the
directors of a corporation are trustees for the stockholders; but it
has been said generally, if not always, with reference to the management by the directors of the property or business of the corporation itself. We proceed to notice the cases.
The case of Robinson v. Smith, 3 Paige 222, has no analogy to
this. It was there held that the directors of a joint stock corporation
who wilfully abuse their trust, or misapply the funds of the company, by which a loss is sustained, are personally liable as trustees
to make good that loss; and they are also liable if they suffer the
corporate funds to be lost or wasted by gross negligence and inattention to the duties of their trust. In Verplank v. The Mihferchants' Insurance Company, 1 Edwards 84, it was held that when
a corporation aggregate is formed, and the management and control of its officers are in the hands of directors, the latter become
the agents and trustees of the corporators, and a relation is created
between the stockholders and those directors, who, as trustees,
become accountable for dereliction of duty and violation of trust.
The case made by the allegations of the bill was, that the directors had violated the act of incorporation by granting life annuities, without having set apart or appropriated any portion of the
capital as an annuity fund; by buying and selling goods and
merchandise, it being declared unlawful for the company to deal,
use or employ any part of their stock, funds or money in such
business, and in buying and selling or investing their money in
stock or funded debt.
The case of Scott v. -Depeyster,in the same volume, p. 513, is
thus stated by the Vice Chancellor, p. 527, "This is a bill by one
of the stockholders of the National Insurance Company in behalf
of himself and all others who may come in and contribute to the
expenses of the suit, against the president and directors of the
same company, in their individual capacities, to compel them, per-
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sonally, to account for and make good the losses sustained in the
capital stock of the company by the frauds and embezzlements of
their secretary."
The statement of the case is sufficient to show that it has no
bearing upon the question involved here.
In the case of the Cumberland Coal ,&Iron Co. v. Sherman,
30 Barb. 558, it was held that a director of a corporation is the
agent or trustee of the stockholders, and as such has duties to discharge of a fiduciary nature, towards his principal; and is subject
to-the obligations and disabilities incident to that relation.
This was held in reference to a sale of the property of the corporation, the case having no similarity to the one before us.
In Buist v. Wood, 38 Barb. 181, the relationship of trustee
and cestui que trust is again asserted, but is in this instance applied to the payment by the directors of the funds of the corporation, to an individual upon a pretended claim, which they knew,
or must be presumed to have known, was unfounded.
One more case from New York closes our citations from that
state: Bliss v. .atteson, 45 N. Y. 22.
The following point taken from the syllabus will sufficiently
show the nature of the case. "The directors of a corporation are
trustees of its stockholders, and in a certain sense, of its creditors,
and any agreement to influence the action of such directors for
the benefit of others, and to the prejudice of the company, is
void."
The Bedford Railroad Co. v. Bowzer, 48 Penna. 29, decides,
also, that the directors of a railroad company are trustees for all
the stockholders. We cannot make a more condensed statement
of the case to which it was applied than by quoting the following
paragraph from the syllabus: "Where a board of directors of a
railroad company, after reciting a condition attached to certain
subscriptions by the commissioners, resolved that the condition be
adopted as the act of the company, that the stock of each subscriber be purchased by the company and the payment of the subscription assumed; that the stock be surrendered, subscription
annulled and cancelled by the secretary; such action on the part
of the board was irregular and unauthorized, and the cancellation
of the subscription in accordance therewith invalid; and it was
error on part of the court to charge the jury that if the company
had assets sufficient to pay their debts, the cancellation was valid,
and released the subscribers, of whom the defendant was one."
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This case it will be seen has no features in common with that
under consideration.
In Bayless v. Orne, Freman's C. R. 161, the trust relationship is asserted, and applied to the case of an abuse of their trust
by the directors, or waste or. misapplication of the funds of the
company.
The case of Rodges v. New -EnglandScrew Co., 1 R. I. 812,
holds that the directors of a corporation are liable in equity for a
fraudulent breach of trust. The fraud charged related to the
management of the business and affairs of the corporation, viz.:
"that they took stock in an Iron Company on account of the
Screw Company, before two hundred shares had been bondfide
subscribed for; that they and the officer concealed important transactions and papers from the plaintiff, and refused him access to
the same ; that they paid more than the market price for the rods
furnished them by the Iron Company; that they had violated the
by-laws of the company; that the business and profits of the company had been diminished by diverting the time and care of its
officers to the concerns of the Iron Company, the officers and
agents of one company being likewise the officers and agentsof
the other; and that they bad managed the concerns of the two
companies with a view to reduce the value of the plaintiff's stock,
in order to force him to sell it to them at a greatly diminished
price, and retire from the company."
In this case it is clear enough, according to the charges, that
the directors might justly be regarded as the trustees of the stockholders, because the wrong charged was all done in the management of the business and affairs of the corporation. The case,
however, is totally unlike the one under"consideration: -European,
ft., Railway Go. v. Poor, 59 Maine 277, holds that if a director
of a railroad corporation enter into a contract for the construction
of the road of his corporation, lie cannot then, nor subsequently,
personally derive any benefit from such contract. This we recognise as good law, but it needs no argument to show that it has no
application to the case before us.
The case of Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. 331, involves questions
entirely foreign to that under consideration here. Dodge was the
owner of thirty shares in the Commercial Branch Bank of
Cleveland, and lie filed a bill in the Circuit Court of the United
States for the district of Ohio, against the bank, the directors, and
the tax collector, to enjoin the collection of a tax assessed by the
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state of Ohio on the bank, upon ground stated in his bill. The
Circuit Court enjoined the collection of the tax and the judgment
was affirmed.
The case of Koeler v. Black Biver _alls Iron Company, 2
Black 715, was a bill in Chancery to foreclose a mortgage purporting to have been executed by the company, to secure the payment of $15,000. The bill, upon the hearing was dismissed. The
decree was affirmed upon two grounds. First, That the corporate
seal was wrongfully affixed to the mortgage. Second, That the
mortgage had been unjustly obtained, in this: two of the nominal
mortgagees were directors of the company; the company was
embarrassed and desired to borrow money; at a meeting of the
stockholders a resolution was passed authorizing the directors to
obtain as large a loan as they could, and secure the same by mortgage on the lands and works of the company. $1200 in money,
and $800 in provisions, were received by the company, and for the
residue the mortgagees assumed the payment of several debts due
from the company in which they, or some of them, were interested.
The court say: "Instead of honestly effecting a loan of money
advantageously, for the benefit of the corporation, these directors
in violation of their duty, and in betrayal of their trust, secured
their own debts, to the injury of the stockholders and creditors.
Directors cannot thus deal with important interests intrusted to
their management. They hold a place of trust, and by accepting
the trust are obliged to execute it with fidelity, not for their own
benefit, but for the commoi benefit of the stockholders. In
executing this mortgage, and thereby securing to themselves
advantages which were not common to all the stockholders, they
were guilty of an unauthorized act, and violated a plain principle
of equity applicable to trustees. The directors are trustees or
managing partners, and the stockholders are the cestuis que trust,
and have a joint interest in all the property and effects of the
corporation, and no injury that the stockholders may sustain by a
fraudulent breach of trust can, upon the general principle of
equity, be suffered to pass without a remedy." This is another
case in which the wrong imputed to the directors had reference to
their management of the affairs of the company.
We now turn to the English cases. A leading one is that of
York and N. ff. Railway Co. v. Hudson, 22 L. J. Rep. N. S.
Chan. 529; s. c. 16 Beav. 485. The corporation in that case
VOL. XXI.1-26
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had been chartered in the rcigrn of William IV. Subsequently in
the reign of Victoria, an Act of Parliament was passed authorizing the formation of new lines of railway, and the increase of
the capital stock of the company. Accordingly the stock was increased 50,000 shares. Of these shares 37,950 were divided
amongst the original stockholders; and the residue, amounting to
12,050, were to be left at the disposal of the directors.
The relief sought in the case related only to a portion of the
shares so left at the disposal of the directors. The number of
shares in respect to which relief. was sought, was 5259. These
shares had been sold by Hudson, who was chairman of the company, at a premium, and the object of'the suit was to compel him
to account for the profit he thus made on the sale of the shares.
With reference to the case made, the Master of the Rolls said:
"The directors are persons selected to manage the affairs of the
company for the benefit of the shareholders. It is an office of
trust, which, if they undertake, it is their duty to perform fully.
and entirely. A resolution by the shareholders, therefore, that
the shares or any other species of property should be at the disposal of the directors, is a resolution that it shall be at the disposal
of trustees, in other words, that the persons intrusted with the
property shall dispose of it within the scope of the functions delegated to them in the manner best suited to benefit their cestuis
que trust." This was the case of the disposal of the property of
the corporation by a director, for his own benefit. It has no
bearing whatever upon the question'involved here.
In The Great Luxembourg Bailway Gompany v. .Thoguay, 25
Beav. 586, a railway company had furnished a director with a
large sum of money to enable him to purchase the "concession"
of another line. He purchased it, as it turned out, from himself,
he being the concealed owner of it. It was held that the transaction could not stand.
In the case Exparte Bennett, 18 Beav. 859, the directors permitted a class of dissentient shareholders in an embarrassed company to transfer their shares to the companyr, under a power in the
deed, upon payment of a sum of money, which it was arranged
should be paid to one of the directors in discharge of a debt due
from the company. Held, that the transaction was void, and, on
the winding up of the company, that the dissentients still remained
shareholders.
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The relation of trustee and cestui que tru8t is assumed in the
case. The case was put upon the ground that the director had
obtained an undue advantage in securing the payment of his debts
from an embarrassed company.
The next and last case is that of Jfalsham v. Stainton, 1 De
Gex, Jones & Smith 678. We cannot state this case in a more
concise manner than by transcribing the syllabus.
"Joseph Stainton and Henry Stainton, who were confidential
agents of a company, conspired together to depress the selling
price of the shares by a system of false accounts and concealment,
in order that they might purchase them at an undervalue. By
reason of this scheme, fifty-five shares belonging to Garbett were
sold much below their real value, fifteen to Joseph Stainton and
forty to Henry Stainton. The executor of Garbett, upon discovering the fraud which had been practised, filed his bill against
the executor of Joseph Stainton and the executor of Henry
Stainton for relief in respect to all the shares.
"The representatives of Joseph Stainton demurred for want of
equity and multifariousness. Held, that although Joseph Stainton
derived no benefit from the sale of the forty shares at an undervalue, yet as he stood in a fiduciary position towards the shareholders, and was a party to the fraud, he as well as Henry Stainton
was liable to Garbett for the real value of the shares, and that his
executor was a proper party to a suit in respect of them: Held,
also, that as both sales were affected by the same fraud, it w as not
multifarious to combine the cases as to the fifteen and the forty
shares in the same bill."
In this cause there was not only actual fraud on the part of the
Staintons, but that fraud, whether committed as agents or officers
of the company, consisted of fraudulent acts committed by them in
their management of the affairs of the company, whereby the apparent value of the shares was depreciated. The case states that
Joseph Stainton was manager of the company at Carron from 1786
to his death in 1825, and his brother Henry Stainton was London
agent of the company from 1808 till his death in 1851.
The fraud charged was that Joseph Stainton entered on the
books of the company large quantities of goods sold to the Board
of Ordnance at prices much less than those actually paid, and invested the difference in his own name in government stock. This
was carried on with the help of Henry Stainton, as manager in

